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Introduction
The history of New Zealand’s foreign policy, like that of its aviation policy,
was determined by the nation’s involvement in the two world wars. As a British
colony, then a Dominion of the British Empire, then a member of the British
Commonwealth of Nations, New Zealand’s overseas orientation centred on Great
Britain until World War Two. From 1872 until well into the twentieth century
New Zealand’s only significant overseas post - the Agent-General or trade
commission - was in London. Her fledgling Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the
Imperial Affairs Section of the Prime Minister’s Office from 1926 to 1943.
Interest in Europe was a natural next step. New Zealand fought in Europe in
both world wars and took a keen interest in post-war settlements and in trade
opportunities.
In terms of the development of New Zealand’s aviation industry, both world
wars had been beneficial in a number of ways. War had in fact been for the
country, as it had also been to many other nations, a great “forging house of
experience” ensuring that aircraft reliability and speed advanced in leaps and
bounds. The experience of war also ensured the rapid development of the
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necessary aeronautical skills which in turn formed the basis of the country’s post-
war development in aviation.
―――――――――――――――
After the First World War Germany, denied a military establishment by the
Treaty of Versailles, grew restive when the Allies made little progress toward
disarmament, and in many ingenious ways began to build up a clandestine air
establishment. Aircraft companies set up branches abroad while at home the civil
airline, Lufthansa, kept the industry alive.
Young Germans were encouraged to take up gliding, while others acquired
valuable pilot experience training with the Russian Air Force. After a series of
excellent modern prototypes were created, Germany secretly began to plan a new
air force. And at Nuremburg in 1935 Hitler, with dramatic suddenness, unveiled
the new Luftwaffe before a frightened world. Germany had become a major
power in the air.
The period of the 1930s, haunted by the memory of World War One, displays
a curious ambivalence. While Germany was rearming in the name of a New
Order designed to redress its wartime grievances, the Allies still recoiling from the
horrors of the war, were striving desperately to create a world without arms. The
League of Nations Disarmament Conference, meeting in 1932, made a final,
earnest effort to achieve agreement while the Allied nations, awaiting the outcome,
let their defenses deteriorate. Meanwhile, the world began once more to slide
toward war. Japan invaded China, Hitler began to create his new Germany, Italy
snatched up Ethiopia, Spain (where Hitler tried out his new warplanes) erupted
into civil war, and the League of Nations, after Germany, Italy, and Japan had
resigned, began to disintegrate. The Disarmament Conference itself came to a
weary, fruitless end in 1934.
Although the United States at this time possessed a few heavy bombers, the
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concept of strategic bombing was still under attack as being both barbarous and
unnecessary. But as a result of the Munich crisis, and when General H.H.
Arnold was appointed Chief of the US Air Corps, the future of the bomber
programme was assured. In far-off Japan the American Navy for many years had
quietly been building up a formidable fleet, with special emphasis on carriers and
swift fighter craft. The Russians, following the ideas of Douhet after World War
One, had specialised for a time in huge, four-engined bombers ; but after the
importance of attack-aviation had been demonstrated in the Spanish Civil War,
they began to emphasize close cooperation with the army command. The
massing of parachute troops was a Russian idea, although used for the most part
by other nations during the war.
The stage was set for World War Two. With frightening suddenness
Germany attacked Poland on September 1,1939, and a shocked world was quickly
made to realize the new importance of air power.
―――――――――――――――
Throughout the First World War New Zealand stayed within the framework of
the British war effort. But there were two important changes that made the
Second World War a very different war from the First. Soviet and American
participation in the war and commitment to post-war collaboration promised a
more successful transformation of international relations than had been managed
after World War One by either the League of Nations or international socialism.
And war against Japan forced New Zealand to conduct its own diplomacy, to
establish a High Commission in Canberra and an embassy in Washington.
New Zealand was forced to think in terms of international rather than purely
Commonwealth relations.1) But in the first year of the war these considerations
1) Sinclair, K.,(ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand , Oxford, 1990, p252.
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were remote. This was a war against Germany fought by France and Britain -
even in Europe most countries were neutral. The hesitation about Japan’s
intentions apparently vanished with the outbreak of war. Having received
assurances from the British Admiralty about Japan, New Zealand agreed to
organise an expeditionary force which would train in Egypt, to be ready to fight
later in France.
With war now underway in Europe, New Zealand, geographically isolated
from the rest of the world, found herself vulnerable, particularly as she possessed
only a small air force. And so in 1936 Wing Commander R.A. Cochrane, who
had been involved in the development of Britain’s air force, arrived in New
Zealand to oversee the development of a local force. New Zealand’s plan to
build up a fleet of strategic bombers for her own defence was reinforced by her
doubts expressed at the Pacific Defence Conference in Wellington in April 1939 as
to whether Britain was able to hold the strategically important Singapore in the
event of war in the Pacific. In any event the decision was made to use Fiji as an
advance base from which to patrol the Pacific ; and it was also agreed that New
Zealand would share the costs of developing this base with Great Britain.2)
There were a number of reasons for the selection of Fiji. Most important
was the island group’s strategic position, lying approximately a thousand miles to
the north of New Zealand. It was also the centre of wireless, cable and air
communications in the south Pacific, and it possessed a harbour that could easily
accommodate a large fleet. By 1939 Fiji had been comprehensively surveyed and
the development of air facilities in the island group was well underway3). The
only other alternative as a strategic base worthy of development was Tonga but
2) National Archives, Army 12/22 Pacific Defence Conference Report.
3) EA 110/3/7. Report by Gibson on Fiji survey.
－５１４－
（ ４ ）
that island group lacked a sufficient water supply. Construction of the three
runways at Nausori commenced in September 1939 and was completed the
following year in March. Britain also contributed half the cost of developing an
airstrip in Tonga.
The Pacific Defence Conference marked the beginning of a period of
cooperation between New Zealand and Australia whereby the two Dominions
agreed to commence joint reconnaissance operations in the South West Pacific. It
was agreed that New Zealand aircraft would become involved in operations in the
event of an attack from Japan, and as this threat became ever more imminent,
immediate plans were put in motion to reinforce not only Fiji but also the cable
station at Fanning Island.
France’s capitulation in June 1940 necessitated the withdrawal of British
warships from the Pacific to strengthen her fleet in the English Channel.
Consequently this move left the Pacific theatre to be patrolled by Australian and
New Zealand vessels. In effect, the four notable New Zealand warships, the Leith,
Wellington , Achilles, and Leander , had been involved in patrolling the Pacific
since 1936, with the latter two having also patrolled the South Atlantic and the
Indian Oceans.
The Second World War nearly aborted New Zealand’s embryonic international
airline before it was safely born. With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the
British Overseas Airways Corporation (formed in 1939 by the amalgamation of
Imperial and British Airways) would have preferred to retain the second two of the
three flying boats earmarked for Tasman Empire Airways Limited in New Zealand
for her own use. TEAL owed its ability to begin airline operations on April 30th
1940 to the steadfastness of Peter Fraser, the Deputy Prime Minister to Michael
Joseph Savage.
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In the face of considerable political pressure from Britain, Fraser remained
adamant that the two remaining aircraft ordered from Shorts be delivered to New
Zealand. The first Empire flying boat, the Aotearoa , had arrived on August 28
1939, and it was only due to Fraser’s insistence on its importance to New Zealand
that the second, the Awarua, finally arrived on April 3rd 19404).
From Great Britain’s point of view, the loss of two flying boats from her
shores at this time was of little consequence ; but for New Zealand these craft
represented her only regular and reliable contact with the outside world. Because
of the danger from enemy raiders and submarines, normal shipping services were
disrupted, so only the flying boats were capable of running an uninterrupted
service. However to operate at a minimum such a basic service required at least
two aircraft - hence the importance of the arrival of the Awarua .
The New Zealand government had been interested in the establishment of
international air links throughout most of the 1930s, but its primary commitment
was to Britain. Thus in 1934 it rejected separate proposals from Charles Ulm and
Kingsford Smith for New Zealand - Australia - Pacific services which would fly
American aircraft and link with Pan American Airways. British aircraft and
Imperial Airways were the only acceptable options.
The initial concept for the formation of Tasman Empire Airways Limited
arose out of the enthusiastic advocacy of a private individual, Colonel N. Falla,
chairman of both the Union Steam Ship Company and Union Airways. He
suggested to Imperial Airways in 1935 that a joint company be formed to operate
a trans-Tasman service which would connect with the Qantas - Imperial Airways
route to Britain. Following on from his initiative the three governments began
4) The third aircraft, Australia , was seriously damaged at Basra on its delivery flight and
after repair went on to the BOAC register under the name Clare.
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negotiations which led in 1937 to a preliminary agreement to form an airline with
tripartite ownership.
Strictly speaking, ownership was shared between four parties as the New
Zealand share was split between Union Airways and the New Zealand government.
TEAL itself was not formally registered as a company until April 26 1940, five
days before the first scheduled service. During the preceding establishment phase
the three Union companies were the effective managers of the whole operation.
The three Short S-30 flying boats for the trans-Tasman route were initially ordered
by Qantas, and then transferred to Imperial Airways register to hold on behalf of
the Union Steam Ship Company which paid for them. Union Airways staff
carried out the practical duties which helped to establish a flying boat base and an
airline service. And even when once the airline had been set up, the day-to-day
running of the company remained with Union Airways, the company having been
appointed managing agent for the fledgling airline.
The establishment of TEAL took place during a time of major political
upheaval both within New Zealand and on the international scene, and this
contributed to the prolonged and often difficult negotiations which preceded
registration of the company. In 1935 New Zealand elected its first Labour
government, an assembly filled with reforming zeal and strong ideas about the role
government should play in the country’s affairs. The new Labour party related its
policy to a vision of future development. Although many of Labour’s actions
were in fact more pragmatic than theoretical, the new Government stimulated the
economy, attacked economic problems in a more concerted, rational, and planned
manner, and made a real if not entirely successful attempt to diversify and insulate
the economy.5) However, as far as TEAL was concerned, government involvement
5) See for example The Oxford History of New Zealand , Oxford, 1988, p248.
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in the final negotiations which lasted just over two weeks ending on April 25th
1940, created a major problem in what dividend the company should pay.
Because of his socialist principles, Walter Nash, the Minister of Finance in
the new government, grudgingly agreed on a three percent dividend and this was
set as the maximum for the first year, with a maximum six percent set for
subsequent years.
Nash also insisted that this new government should not hold a smaller share
than any private company, especially one that was ultimately British-owned.
Thus the final allocation of shares was : New Zealand Government 20 percent and
Union Airways 19 percent, making a New Zealand total of 39 percent ; Qantas
Empire Airways 38 percent, and BOAC 23 percent. Initial capital was 250,004
pounds sterling, increased three months later to 500,000 pounds.6)
Though it was complicated enough trying to run a company which had three
owners with often quite different and varying objectives, TEAL also faced another
major frustration. All its decisions were subject to approval by the Tasman Air
Commission, a specially established body which reported directly to the New
Zealand, Australian and British governments. In effect it wielded the real power
in the running of TEAL. All TEAL’s operations and administration staff were
based in Auckland, while the Tasman Air Commission was in Wellington. To
compound this awkward arrangement, the head office of Union Airways was also
based in Wellington. It was no wonder that the deputy chairman of TEAL, A.E.
Rudder, told the first meeting of the Commission that “the peculiar set-up and
6) Slater, B., “A Case Study : Air New Zealand 1939 - 1978”, Research Essay, University
of Auckland, 1979, pp18-21. With the passing of the New Zealand National Airways
Act in 1945, the New Zealand government acquired as a result of nationalization of the
country’s internal airlines, the entire New Zealand shareholding in TEAL, amounting to
375,000 One Pound shares.
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organization under which the company is working at present is most
unsatisfactory”. TEAL operated under this arrangement for the duration of the
war.
In late November of 1940 Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister,
made approaches to the British government to secure Hudson aircraft for the New
Zealand air force but was declined on the basis that no appropriate aircraft were
available.7) New Zealand had previously ordered a fleet of Wellington bombers
under Cochrane’s policy, but with war having broken out in Europe these craft had
been diverted for employment within the European theatre. In short, Fraser’s
insistence of air help proved luckless : the Battle of Britain had begun and by and
large all British aircraft were employed at home in order to help defend the
country. And so the British government suggested that New Zealand should
approach the US for any future aircraft orders.
Pan American Airways had been the key proponent for the early development
of a service along the trans-Pacific routes to Asia and to New Zealand, and the
various bases involved now took on added significance with the outbreak of war.
In September 1941, as tensions with Japan arose, the American government sought
to reinforce the Philippines by way of a southern air route and instructed the State
Department to contact the governments of Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia,
the Netherlands, and the Free French to obtain the necessary authority.8)
Certain features of the American policy resembled that of Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand : as well as a mutual belief that a large bomber force would
deter or destroy any attack, there was also a general reluctance to build or fortify
7) EA 110/3/7, Vol III, pp213-215. Governor General (GG) to Sec State Dominion
Affairs (SSDA) 28/11/1940. SSDA to GG 2/12/1940. GG to SSDA 4/12/1940.
8) Craven, W.F., and Cate, J., The Army Air Forces in World War Two , Vol 2, University
of Chicago, 1948, p180.
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island bases lest they fall into enemy hands. The selected southern route was to
pass through a series of bases comprising Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, American
Samoa, Fiji, the New Hebrides, New Caledonia, and the east coast of Australia.
When the British government approached its Dominions on the proposals, it was
surprised to find that they had already accepted them, the pre-emptive decision on
the part of New Zealand being significant, this being the first time New Zealand
had acted decisively on an aviation issue without consulting Britain. In the
interests of national defence she had swiftly contacted Washington advising that
useful facilities had already been established in Fiji and that surveys already
completed allowed for the construction of bases in Western Samoa and Christmas
Island.9)
At the time of Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbour, New Zealand had one
hundred men stationed on tiny Fanning Island and an infantry brigade in Fiji.
Fiji’s strategic position and its defence was of paramount importance, it quickly
being understood that its fall put New Zealand in a perilous position bringing the
country into the range of Japanese air strikes, thereby effectively cutting off New
Zealand’s sea and air communications with the rest of the world. With these
points in mind the respective governments of New Zealand, Australia and Britain
mutually agreed with the American government that joint operations were
necessary to not only defend the territories of the Pacific but to repel the enemy
from the area. And so Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to divide up spheres of
influence : Britain would control the Indian Ocean and the US the Pacific. New
Zealand’s fears that the country would be left undefended by this scheme were
waylaid by British guarantees to expose her control of the Middle East and India
9) EA 1, 86/1/11. Fraser to US Consul, Wellington, 24/10/1941.
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and divert that region’s fleet to New Zealand if it was necessary.10) The
Australians were not pleased by US plans to divide the Pacific into regions :
arbitrary lines along the map of the Pacific placed New Zealand and Fiji in a
different region to Australia and split her national interests, the concern being that
both New Zealand and Fiji were the principal links in her communications with
the US and Britain.11)
During the Second World War the trans-Pacific route through Fiji became
New Zealand’s primary means of communication with the rest of the world. The
shortage of any shipping by sea not only meant that New Zealand became
dependent upon air communications but also led to a massive volume of traffic
along the route thereby demonstrating the potential of future trans-Pacific air
transportation. At that time international mail carried by air along this route more
than doubled the quantity carried by sea.12) And central to New Zealand’s war-
time communications with the outside world were the two TEAL flying boats that
serviced the routes with both Australia and Fiji. In January 1942 the Awarua
became the first British trans-Pacific airliner when it flew Walter Nash as far as
Honolulu.
Discontented Australians
The precedent set by the dominance of larger nations with the establishment
10) New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs. Documents Relating to New Zealand’s
Participation in the Second World War, Vol III, p172. Secretary of State Dominion
Affairs to PM 17/3/1942.
11) Ibid, p194. PM Australia to PM New Zealand 29/3/1942.
12) EA 1, 110/3/7. Shanahan to Acting Controller Civil Aviation. 27/7/1944. Mail
July-December 1943 : by air (1009 lbs), by sea (409 lbs). All civilian mail carried by air
free of surcharge.
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of the Treaty of Versailles and the meetings of major powers at Cairo13) and
Tehran14) had led to concerns that the future of the Pacific would be decided
without any New Zealand or Australian input. Further, the Second World War
had radically altered ANZAC perceptions of national security and defence. It was
thus seen by the two governments as vitally important to establish common
ground so that a united front could be presented in international conventions to
lend greater weight to their views.
Japan’s rapid expansion throughout Southeast Asia had created an
unprecedented threat to Australasian security. With Japanese land forces attacking
Hong Kong and taking in February 1942 the British base in Singapore, the Asian
and European streams of war converged, and the conflict became truly global.15)
Britain’s disinterest in turning Singapore into a major naval base in the 1920s and
30s had demonstrated that British interests in the region were starting to differ
from that of both New Zealand and Australia ; at the same time New Zealand and
Australia had realized that when it came to national defence, their policies were in
fact interdependent and should be considered as a strategic whole.16) This view
was reinforced by the fact that no European nation with colonial interests in
Southeast Asia had been capable of mounting anything more than token resistance
to Japan’s advance, in part due to more pressing concerns and commitments in the
European theatre of war. This action - or inaction - demonstrated on another
level the European powers’ lack of sufficient resources to deal with major
13) Kay, R., Documents on New Zealand External Relations, Vol I, Australia - New
Zealand Agreement 1944 (ANZAG DOC), No 40, High Commissioner to Australia to
Minister External Affairs, 4/12/1943.
14) Conference held November 28th - December 1st 1943.
15) Laracy, H., “World War Two”, Tides of History. The Pacific Islands in the Twentieth
Century, 1994, p149.
16) ANZAG DOC, No 32, Charges d’Affaires Washington (Cox) to PM, 31/3/1943.
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commitments both at home and abroad. The situation had caused particular
concern to Australia who had traditionally viewed Dutch and Portuguese
possessions in Timor as a cornerstone of national defence.17)
By late 1943 the Australian government had decided to formulate views on a
post war Pacific, an approach that the American government had already adopted
earlier the same year.18) And with the immediate crises and dangers of the war
now subsiding, attention returned to some extent to pre-war concerns. However,
both New Zealand and Australia were aware of the dangers as well as the
opportunities in adopting a new policy.
Throughout 1942 and the following year Australia became increasingly
dismayed with Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s grand strategy as a promulgation of the
war. When Japan invaded both Papua and New Guinea in 1942, Churchill had
tried to dissuade Curtin unsuccessfully from withdrawing the Australian 9th
Division from the Middle East to return to Australia, and New Zealand also
expressed strong concerns about sending her forces home. Both New Zealand
and Australia were pressured by the British and the Americans to leave their forces
in the Middle East on account of the’broader picture’, and when New Zealand did
finally agree to leave a division in place, Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister,
went into a fury. According to Australia, New Zealand had agreed to a policy of
interdepedent defence and had not consulted Australia before making her
decision.19)
The Australian government was now perturbed at the apparent lack of
17) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949 , Vol 6, Doc 233 ; also P. Hastings,
‘The Timor Problem 3 ; Some Australian Attitudes 1941-1950,’ Australian Outlook, 29,
No 3, 1975, pp323-334.
18) ANZAG DOC, No 32, Charges d’Affaires Washington (Cox) to PM, 31/3/1943.
19) Ibid, No 26, 1/6/1943.
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concern shown by both Britain and America in defending Australasian interests ;
moreover, it seemed that Britain and the USA were doing their best to convince
New Zealand not to participate in operations. The military advice that the New
Zealand government received from the US Combined Chiefs of Staff suggested
that the New Zealand Second Division would be of greater use in the Middle East
theatre. At this time Australia had advised the powers, including New Zealand,
that the situation in New Guinea was now critical and that a further two divisions
were urgently required to reinforce local defences.
Australian anger and frustration with both Britain and the US was further
compounded by a particular clash with Britain involving certain air rights and sov-
ereignty of Portuguese territory in the Pacific.
When in 1941 Japanese troops entered Portuguese Timor, the Australians
unapologetically dispatched troops to the territory as its location was seen as
strategically crucial to the defence of Australia. The British were quite unhappy
about the situation, seeing the action as tantamount to an invasion. Portugal was
not only a neutral nation, but also under an old treaty that had existed for over six
hundred years, that nation was in effect Britain’s oldest ally. A neutral and
friendly Portugal had helped to ensure the stability of the Iberian peninsula,
particularly with regard to the British base at Gibraltar. Further, the British had
been conducting secret negotiations with Portugal concerning the granting of air
landing rights in the Azores, in return for which Great Britain would help to
safeguard the sovereignty of Portuguese territories. The Australian government
were infuriated in February 1942 when a Portuguese force heading for Timor had
turned back after being threatened by an advancing Japanese force, calling the
Portuguese force “unfit” to defend the island given their “vacillation and timidity
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in the face of Japanese aggression”.20) Both Curtin and Evatt were careful not to
claim or want to claim sovereignty over the island as Australia was still bound by
the Atlantic Charter of 1941 which set out that Allied nations would not make any
territorial acquisitions after the war. They were in agreement that a gentle
approach needed to be taken so as not to jeopardize any future, ultimate plans to
acquire the island.21)
Roosevelt understood Australia’s concern and involvement in the Portuguese
colony of Timor and saw its future as a ‘free port’22), while Australia wanted the
territory either demilitarized or turned into an Australian stronghold to be leased
from the Dutch and the Portuguese.23) Either way there was general agreement to
Australia maintaining a permanent military presence and taking over the defence
of the territory. And as a concession to Britain, to help her to facilitate use of the
Azores, the Australian government was willing to defer any claims on Timor until
after the war when talks could be held with the Portuguese regarding a
commercial agreement over air communications. The Australian government now
saw the development of civil aviation as just as important and vital to national
security as any military development.24)
Australia’s security concerns and desire for extraterritorial privileges were not
only confined to Timor, but also concerned Dutch New Guinea, the French
possessions of the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, as well as a number of
20) Australian External Affairs to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Sept. 3,
1945, pp323-334.
21) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949 , Vol 6, Doc 230, Evatt to Bruce
20/11/1943.
22) ANZAG DOC 32, New Zealand Legation, Washington to Fraser, 31/3/1944.
23) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949 , Vol 6, Doc 230, Evatt to Bruce
20/11/1943.
24) Ibid, Doc 292, Curtin to Bruce, and Doc 316, Bruce to Curtin 27/10/1943.
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smaller British-controlled islands, and underlying this expansionist desire was a
strong sense of disdain towards France, the Netherlands, and Portugal for their
lack of any real war effort. Australia, like the US, doubted the merits of these
nations’post-war presence in the Pacific.
By now both the Australian and New Zealand governments were concerned at
Britain’s lack of support in protecting Commonwealth Pacific interests ; it now
appeared to these two governments that Britain was acquiescing to American
efforts to dominate the Pacific by continuously attempting to placate both New
Zealand and Australian concerns. Australia saw the Britain could not guarantee
any Commonwealth interests in the Pacific after the war, and thus initiated
negotiations direct with the US on peace matters and arrangements without
consulting other Commonwealth nations.25) Both New Zealand and Australia
were irritated by Britain’s decision at the Cairo Conference to give back Formosa
to China, a move that was seen as brusque, particularly as it concerned Pacific
interests about which neither Australia nor New Zealand were notified. Britain
was seen to be courting the US and conducting the war according to a strategy
that placed her own security above that of the rest of the Empire, one that
appeared not unlike that of the First World War, and now which favoured placating
her European neighbours over her Commonwealth interests. In any event, in
New Zealand both Nash and Fraser became keen to guarantee New Zealand
involvement in any post-war Pacific settlement by pushing for the continual use of
RNZAF aircraft in the Pacific war, a move which was eventually stymied by
American interests which called for American combat forces when the front lines
25) ANZAG DOC 44, Pacific Conference Agenda I, in particular the Cairo and Tehran
Conferences. The Moscow declaration of October 1943 stated that the four powers
would act on behalf of the community of nations until an international organization was
formed. Australia did not welcome the interim limitation of security to only four powers.
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advanced north over the Equator.
By 1944 when there was a plethora of both Allied military and air resources
in the Pacific, brought in primarily to help establish a base to initiate a major
offensive against the Japanese, certain members of the US Naval High Command
commented that neither New Zealand nor Australia were going to be given an
opportunity to lay any claim, in any form, on the future of Micronesia through
their respective war efforts in the Pacific.26) This comment was of major concern
to New Zealand who wanted to maintain a presence in both the northern and
western Pacific regions in order to enhance her position in post-war talks.
However, New Zealand’s Chief of Staff, Leonard Issitt, believed that the US
decision was not primarily a political one but rather one that was military-based.
Fraser perceived that the US decision was based on a fear of apparent New
Zealand aspirations in the northern Pacific, and directed Nash to assure him that
the New Zealand government was agreeable to US claims to the Marshall and
Caroline islands27). In any event there was now wide spread concern in the New
Zealand capital that Britain’s traditional interests in the Pacific, including her
former interest in developing civil aviation in the area, were abating, a concern
which was fuelled by the comments of Lord Beaverbrook at the inter-Dominion
Conference of October 194328). Beaverbrook suggested that the development of
Empire air route links, concerning adjacent territories, should be the responsibility
of Commonwealth members, citing the Indian route as one in which British
airlines may be involved ; no mention was made of any Pacific interest.29) Now,
26) Ibid, No 87, New Zealand Minister Washington to High Commission London, 16/5/
1944.
27) Ibid, No 84, TO 90.
28) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-1949 , Vol 7, Doc 8, D’Alton to Evatt 8/
1/1944.
29) Ibid, Vol 6, Doc 299, Bruce to Curtin, 13/10/1943.
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in the apparent absence of direct British interest or concern in the Pacific, Fraser
reminded his Australian counterpart of the need to ”protect British interests”
Conclusion
From the New Zealand government’s point of view, American interest and
involvement in the Pacific had both positive and negative aspects : on the one
hand the US was a strong ally whose relationship with New Zealand was
considered indispensible particularly during the war years. Fraser had publicly
acknowledged that the future security and development of the Pacific region could
only be achieved in cooperation with the US and for that reason he foresaw no
difficulties in discussions regarding the fate of certain American bases30). However
on the other hand and at the same time, New Zealand like Australia, maintained a
strong desire to protect her interests in the Pacific and the Americans were well
aware that both New Zealand and Australia favoured only to a limited extent an
American presence in the Pacific. Irrespective of any view, one common point
remained paramount : all the parties concerned realised the growing importance
and significance of air communications throughout the Pacific region.
Before World War Two the US had made claims of sovereignty over British
possessions in the Pacific by quietly depositing small groups of settlers on various
islands, and by 1943 there was scarcely an Allied-occupied island in the region
that did not have a sizeable garrison of American troops or least an American-built
airstrip. However the build-up of American personnel throughout these islands did
not constitute or could not be considered another “fatal impact” as on other Pacific
shores. Although some land was procured from the indigenous people for the use
30) ANZAG DOC, No 75, Press statement in Washington, 18 April 1944.
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by Allied forces, the war did help usher in a period of unprecedented foreign
expenditure. Garrisoned troops, made up mainly of Americans, spent their
earning locally and interacted with the indigenous people on most islands, with the
American forces being not only more numerous than those from the
Commonwealth, but also spent more simply because they had more money to
spend. In fact, it was usual even when the front lines were advancing for small
groups of about a dozen soldiers to remain behind to maintain American control
of facilities pending a decision on disposal.31)
From the early years of the twentieth century the United States Navy had
played a significant role in American interest throughout the Pacific region, with
their war-time dominance leading to calls for territorial remuneration for their
efforts32). The Navy had been instrumental in not only helping to establish the
pre-war “colonies” but also by conducting important surveys on potential aviation
facilities, and even during the war had continued to conduct surveys on a number
of French, British, and New Zealand-held possessions. With the outbreak of war
in the Pacific, New Zealand realised that pre-war sovereignty issues had not been
resolved, and the country now viewed this American dominance with concern as
there were by this time indications that American aspirations in the Pacific were
resurfacing. All these activities on the part of the New Zealand government -
both political and military - in the early war years helped to lay the foundations
for not only a firmer post-war aviation policy, but also for the development of the
country’s post-war domestic and international civil air services.
31) EA 1, 110/3/7. Shanahan to Acting Controller Civil Aviation, 27/7/1944.
32) Renouf, A., Let Justice Be Done : The Foreign Policy of Dr.H.V. Evatt, p128.
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